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Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 2877 
(Mem) 
 
Tristan T. Riddell  
I. ABSTRACT 
In Drakes Bay the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit ruled that language 
within appropriations legislation aimed specifically at the expiration of the Drakes Bay Oyster 
Company’s Reservation of Use and Occupancy within Point Reyes National Seashore provided 
the Secretary of the Interior discretion whether to issue a new special use permit for oyster 
farming.  The inclusion of the term “notwithstanding” ensured that the Secretary was not 
obligated to consider previously passed legislation, department policy, or any other requirements 
in reviewing whether to reauthorize the special use permit.  The Ninth Circuit held that they had 
jurisdiction to review the narrow issue of whether the Secretary misinterpreted granted authority. 
II. INTRODUCTION 
In Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit 
(“Ninth Circuit”) held that the Secretary of the Interior (“Secretary”) acted within defined 
parameters of § 124 of a Department of the Interior Appropriations Act (“DOI Act”) by allowing 
a special use permit for oyster farming within California’s Point Reyes National Seashore to 
expire.1  Drakes Bay sought injunctive relief under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) 
based on several legal theories, which included violations of: § 124 of the DOI Act, the National 
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), and other federal regulations.2  The Ninth Circuit held that 
the Secretary did not violate any statutory mandate because the “notwithstanding” clause within 
§ 124 provided the Secretary discretion to decide whether or not to extend the existing special 
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use permit.3  Although a NEPA review of the permit denial was completed, the Ninth Circuit 
deemed it unnecessary, and any error tied to the review was found harmless.4 
III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In 1976, portions of the Point Reyes National Seashore, including an area known as 
Drakes Estero, were designated “wilderness” under the Wilderness Act.5  Due to the existence of 
commercial oyster farming operations within Drakes Estero, these areas were designated as 
“potential wilderness.”6  Congress slated lands designated “potential wilderness” for conversion 
to “wilderness” upon termination of incompatible use.7  
In 1972 the Johnson Oyster Co. conveyed lands designated as “potential wilderness” to 
the United States.8  As part of the sale, a forty-year reservation of use and occupancy for oyster 
farming was retained.9  The reservation of use and occupancy stated that upon ‘“expiration of the 
reserved term, a special use permit may be issued for the continued occupancy of the 
property.’”10  The property reservation and use transferred to Drakes Bay upon its purchase of 
the Drakes Estero oyster farm from Johnson Oyster Co.11 
In 2009, Congress passed a special provision, known as §124 related to oyster farming in 
Drakes Estero as part of the of the 2009 DOI Act.12  Section 124 provided that “notwithstanding 
any other provision of law, the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to issue a special use permit 
with the same terms and conditions as the existing authorization . . . for a period of 10 years from 
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November 30, 2012.”13   
Recognizing that “Section 124 ‘grant[ed] [him] the authority to issue a new SUP,’” the 
Secretary directed the National Park Service to allow the Drakes Bay special use permit to 
expire.14  The decision was based on the terms of the reservation and use of occupancy, National 
Park Service policy, and specific legislation aimed at Point Reyes National Seashore wilderness 
designation.15   
Drakes Bay sought an injunction and declaratory judgment based on violation of the 
APA.  The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California denied the preliminary 
injunction and held it lacked jurisdiction to rule on the declaratory judgment because the 
Secretary’s decision was fully discretionary within the statutory context.16   
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Jurisdiction and Scope of the “Notwithstanding” Clause  
Federal courts have “‘jurisdiction to review agency action for abuse of discretion when 
the alleged abuse of discretion involves violation . . . of constitutional, statutory, regulatory, or 
other legal mandates or restrictions.’”17  Here, due to § 124’s “notwithstanding” clause, the Ninth 
Circuit found, reversing the district court, that it had jurisdiction to review whether there was a 
misunderstanding of authority or a misinterpretation of how other statutory provisions impacted 
the Secretary’s decision-making process.18  
The Ninth Circuit found that §124 provided the Secretary with the authorization to act on 
the special use permit.19  This authorization provided the Secretary discretion to either issue or 
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deny a permit.20  The “notwithstanding” clause clarifies that conflicting laws do not block the 
Secretary’s discretion.21  The Point Reyes Wilderness Act was one of those laws.22  The dissent 
contended that legislative history tied to the Point Reyes Wilderness Act supports continuation of 
oyster farming as a compatible use within Drakes Estero and lands designated “wilderness.”23  
The Ninth Circuit held that the clear inclusion of the “notwithstanding” clause was to ensure 
previous legislation, like the Point Reyes Wilderness Act, would not prevent the Secretary from 
exercising discretionary authority under § 124.24  
The inclusion of the “notwithstanding” clause in § 124 provided the Secretary discretion 
in deciding whether or not to renew Drakes Bay’s special use permit.25  Had Congress intended 
to require the Secretary to grant the permit, the Ninth Circuit determined, Congress would have 
excluded the “notwithstanding” provision from § 124 and specifically required such an action.26 
B. Preliminary Injunction Not Warranted 
To receive injunctive relief, Drakes Bay had to establish a likelihood that it would 
succeed on the merits, it would suffer irreparable harm without an injunction, the balance of 
equities was in its favor, and that it was in the public’s interest to grant such relief.27   
Drakes Bay alleged that the Secretary misinterpreted his authority under § 124.28  The 
Ninth Circuit, in denying injunctive relief, found that the Secretary’s decision to allow the permit 
to expire was clearly within his authority.29  The Secretary, in rendering his decision, stated, § 
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124  “does not prescribe the factors on which I must base my decision.”30  In reaching the 
decision, the Secretary considered existing department policy and congressional intent that had 
been expressed in the House committee report of the appropriations bill.31  The Secretary 
correctly recognized that he had the authority to either extend or allow expiration of the existing 
permit.32   
In addition to failing on the merits, Drakes Bay could not show that a balance of equities 
weighed in its favor.33  The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling, stating “[t]he public 
benefits both from the enjoyment of protected wilderness and of local oysters.”34  The Ninth 
Circuit also noted that Drakes Bay had been repeatedly warned of the Secretary’s impending 
decision and was fully aware the reservation of use and occupancy was set to expire in 2012.35 
V. CONCLUSION 
Congress’ use of the “notwithstanding” clause in § 124 left the decision to extend the 
special use permit to the discretion of the Secretary of the Interior.  The sole stipulation tied to 
the decision was that it had to consider existing federal policy, as it pertained to the Wilderness 
Act, the Point Reyes Wilderness Act, and National Park Service management policies.  These 
existing regulatory and policy structures, coupled with the discretionary provision of § 124, 
confirmed the designation of Drakes Estero as “wilderness” and the end of oyster farming 
within the Point Reyes National Seashore.  
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